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This paper studies the causes of price dispersion in the euro area emerging in response to a 
shock that hits all member countries symmetrically. We use a panel VAR model which is 
estimated over the period 1996–2007 to generate impulse responses of a range of price and 
wage variables to an oil price shock. We split our sample of countries into two disjoint groups 
according to the impact of the oil price shock on the overall price level. While cross–country 
heterogeneity in the short–run pass–through can be attributed to different weights of energy 
items in the consumption basket, heterogeneity in the medium–run response of consumer 
prices is mainly due to a different response of wages and salaries in the industry sector, which 
can be attributed to different degrees of price and wage rigidities in the member countries. 
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July 3, 2009 1 Introduction
The European Central Bank (ECB) is mandated to maintain price stability in the
euro area as a whole. However, unless the European Monetary Union (EMU) is a
homogenous economic entity, stabilization at the aggregate level does not preclude
that the member countries are aﬀected in diﬀerent ways by a common exogenous
disturbance, such as an oil price shock (European Central Bank, 2005). As a par-
ticular concern for monetary policy, diﬀerences in national economic structures
and rigidities may cause price adjustments to deviate from each other across
countries. While temporary price dispersion is not necessarily harmful to euro
area economies, persistent heterogeneity in the adjustment of prices can trigger
undesirable consequences such as long–lasting distortions in the development of
relative prices across the member states that can lead to welfare losses for indi-
vidual countries.
Potential causes for inﬂation dispersion in the euro area are discussed, among
others, by European Central Bank (2003) and Hofmann and Remsperger (2005).
First, inﬂation diﬀerentials in a currency union may arise from price level con-
vergence, either because tradable goods prices converge as a result of increased
trade integration or because non–tradable goods prices converge in the wake of
real income convergence. Second, countries may be hit by asymmetric shocks
as discussed extensively in the literature on optimum currency areas (see, e.g.,
Mongelli, 2005, and the references therein). Finally, symmetric shocks may evoke
diﬀerent adjustment processes across countries.
In this paper, by analyzing the eﬀects of oil price shocks that originate on
world oil markets and hit all countries to the same extent, we concentrate on
the latter question, namely, whether a symmetric shock causes asymmetric price
adjustment in the euro area. There are at least two possible reasons for this
scenario. Most obviously, diﬀerent weights of crude oil in the production process
and in the consumption basket will provoke diﬀerent reactions to an oil price
shock. However, if the economies are ﬂexible, the adjustment of relative prices
will take only a few quarters to restore an equilibrium.
In contrast, price dispersion may also arise from diﬀerent degrees of national
structural ineﬃciencies such as imperfect factor mobility or price and wage setting
2rigidities that give rise to long–lasting distortions in relative prices after exogenous
shocks. The empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of price and wage adjust-
ments across euro area countries is large: While for example Altissimo, Ehrmann,
and Smets (2006) and Angeloni and Ehrmann (2007) (just to mention two out
of a wide range of papers) show that inﬂation persistence varies markedly across
countries, Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) and Andersson et al. (2008) provide
evidence on heterogenous wage formation processes in the euro area.
The existence of diﬀerent degrees of national structural ineﬃciencies has im-
portant consequences for the single monetary policy in a currency union. Even
if the ECB succeeds to restore price stability in the medium term, this does
not guarantee that all economies operate at the eﬃcient frontier (Dellas and
Tavlas, 2005). For an inﬂation targeting central bank in a currency union Be-
nigno (2004) showed that if the degrees of rigidities are diﬀerent across countries,
monetary policy should attach a higher weight to the country with a higher degree
of rigidity.
This paper empirically investigates the eﬀects of an oil price shock on con-
sumer prices. Based on a panel vector autoregressive (VAR) model that includes
11 euro area countries, we generate impulse responses of consumer prices to an
unanticipated increase in the oil price taking account of additional macroeconomic
variables – real GDP, the nominal short–term interest rate and the real eﬀective
exchange rate – that might be relevant. We also extend our baseline speciﬁca-
tion by a number of additional variables, which include producer prices, several
sub–components of the consumer price index and real labor costs of the industry
and service sector to gain an insight into the transmission of the oil price shock
through the economy.1
Since the time period of the data that we consider is short, ranging from
1VAR–based analyses of the pass–through from oil price shocks to consumer prices in the
euro area are scarce. We are only aware of two papers. Hahn (2003) studies the impact of oil
price shocks (and other external shocks) to euro area inﬂation at diﬀerent stages of distribution
(import prices, producer prices, consumer prices) using aggregate euro area data for the period
from 1970 to 2002. She ﬁnds that external shocks explain a large fraction of the variance of
prices. Peersman and Van Robays (2008) examine the transmission of oil price shocks to euro
area inﬂation by estimating VAR models for both, the aggregate euro area and each individual
euro area member country for the period from 1986 to 2007. They ﬁnd that inﬂation is largely
driven by second–round eﬀects of increasing wages and that there are substantial asymmetries
across countries, which are mainly due to diﬀerent labor market dynamics.
31996Q1 to 2007Q4, we use cross–sectional information to obtain better estimates
of the parameters. We select this period for three reasons. First, harmonized data,
which allows a detailed cross–country analysis of the transmission of an oil price
shock to consumer prices, is provided by Eurostat only from 1996 on. Second,
the behavior of labor unions in response to oil price shocks today is very diﬀerent
from the 1970s and 1980s, which must be taken appropriately into account when
estimating VAR models over the last two or three decades (Blanchard and Gal´ ı,
2007). Finally, we also expect a common reaction of the national central banks
to oil price shocks in the period directly preceding the beginning of the single
monetary policy, as most of the euro area countries successfully terminated their
disinﬂation policy in the mid–1990s and followed a ﬁxed exchange rate policy
vis–` a–vis the German mark from then on.
To detect heterogeneities in the transmission of a structural shock in the con-
text of a panel VAR model we suggest a data–driven approach that clusters coun-
tries into disjoint groups according to the impact of the oil price shock on the
overall price level. We split our sample of countries into two groups – a high
pass–through group and a low pass–through group – that are endogenously iden-
tiﬁed by using a distance measure, which is determined by the absolute value
of the diﬀerence between cumulated impulse responses of the overall price level.
We consider the responses of consumer prices over diﬀerent horizons, focusing on
the oil price pass–through into national prices in the short– and the medium–run
after the occurrence of the shock.
Our ﬁndings indicate that the response of consumer prices is very heteroge-
nous across member countries. Diﬀerences in the short–run pass–through can be
attributed to the weight of energy items in the consumption basket. However,
heterogeneity in the medium–run response of consumer prices is mainly due to
diﬀerent responses of wages and salaries in the industry sector, which is an indi-
cation of diﬀerent degrees of price and wage rigidities in the member countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a baseline
panel VAR model is estimated under the assumption of homogeneous reactions
across countries to an oil price shock. To study the transmission mechanism, the
impulse responses of a wide range of price and wage variables are computed. In
Section 3 the homogeneity assumption is dropped. Instead, two disjoint groups
4of countries are identiﬁed that exhibit diﬀerent consumer price reactions to an
oil price shock. It is shown how these diﬀerences can be traced back to the
heterogeneity in the transmission mechanism which in turn can be explained by
structural diﬀerences like the the weight of energy in the consumption basket and
the wage setting process. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 Baseline Model
We start the analysis under the assumption that the euro area countries react ho-
mogeneously to an oil price shock. In particular, we assume that country-speciﬁc
intercepts are suﬃcient to account for cross-country diﬀerences. The main use
of this baseline model is to deliver ﬁrst insights into the transmission mechanism
and to serve as a benchmark for the models estimated in the subsequent section
under the hypothesis of heterogeneity.
For the baseline model, we employ a panel VAR model of the form
Xi,t = ci +
p X
j=1
AjXi,t−j + εi,t, (1)
where Xi,t is a vector of endogenous variables for country i, ci is a vector of
country-speciﬁc intercepts, Aj is a matrix of autoregressive coeﬃcients for lag j,
p is the number of lags and εi,t is a vector of error terms. The vector Xi,t consists
of ﬁve variables
Xi,t = [oili,t, stii,t, gdpi,t, reeri,t, hicpi,t]
′ , (2)
where oili,t denotes the oil price measured in euro, stii,t denotes the nominal
short–term interest rate, which serves as the policy instrument of the central bank,
gdpi,t denotes real GDP, reeri,t denotes the real eﬀective exchange rate, and hicpi,t
denotes the overall price level as measured by the Harmonized Consumer Price
Index (HICP). For each variable, we use a pooled set of M ·T observations, where
M denotes the number of countries and T denotes the number of observations
corrected for the number of lags p.
Our sample comprises M = 11 euro area countries: Austria (AT), Belgium
(BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE),
5Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES). The data is
taken from the Eurostat database, except for the real eﬀective exchange rate,
which is from the database of the Bank for International Settlements, and the oil
price, which is from the Reuters EcoWin database.2 The hicp series have been
seasonally adjusted using Census X12. All variables are expressed in logs except
the nominal short–term interest rate that is expressed in percent. The variables
are linearly de–trended for each country separately. The data runs from 1996Q1
to 2007Q4 which is the maximum sample for which harmonized euro area data
are available. We use a lag order of p = 4, which ensures that the residuals are
free of ﬁrst–order autocorrelation as indicated by the LM test of Baltagi (2005,
pp. 97).3
The panel VAR model is estimated via OLS. This is appropriate because the
time series dimension (48 quarters) is large relative to the cross section dimension
(11 countries). Hence, we do not have to resort to GMM techniques advocated
for dynamic panel equations with large M and small T (Baltagi, 2005).
On the basis of the VAR model (1) we generate impulse responses of the vari-
ables to an oil price shock, which is identiﬁed by imposing a triangular orthogo-
nalization with the oil price ordered ﬁrst. This implies that the other variables
are contemporaneously aﬀected by an oil price shock but the oil price is not im-
mediately aﬀected by other shocks. This identiﬁcation assumption is justiﬁed
because the oil price is determined on the world market and most likely not by
the developments in a speciﬁc country, particularly not in the very short run.4
2The oil price refers BFO crude oil, which is composed of the three North Sea grades Brent,
Forties and Oseberg.
3The results of these tests are available from the authors upon request.
4There is currently a debate in the literature about the appropriate identiﬁcation of an oil
price shock. Our approach is closely related to Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007). Other identiﬁcation
approaches have been proposed by Kilian (2009) and Peersman and Van Robays (2008) who
argue that the origins of an oil price change should be be taken into account when analyzing its
macroeconomic consequences. While Kilian (2009) adheres to the triangular orthogonalization,
he replaces the oil price with a more exogenous variable to proxy for oil shocks by constructing
a proxy for unexpected movements in global oil production. Peersman and Van Robays (2008)
distinguish between oil supply and oil demand shocks by additionally including a variable for
global oil production and a variable for world economic activity into the VAR model and by
using the sign restrictions approach.
62.1 Results of the Baseline Speciﬁcation
Figure 1 displays the impulse responses over the ﬁrst 20 quarters after a 10 percent
oil price shock, which corresponds to the estimated standard deviation of the
residuals of the oil equation in the VAR model. The solid lines denote impulse
responses, which are computed from the estimated VAR coeﬃcients. The shaded
areas are the 68 percent Hall percentile conﬁdence intervals, which are constructed
from a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications (Hall, 1994). All variables are
expressed in percent terms, except for the nominal short–term interest rate which
is expressed in basis points at an annual rate (100 basis points equal one percent).
When a ten percent oil price shock hits the economy, there is an immediate
increase in the general price level of roughly 0.1 percent. This is not a surprise
because the oil price has a direct and instantaneous impact on the prices for
heating oil and gasoline. At the same time, the short–term interest rate is shifted
upwards, presumably in an attempt of the central bank to counter the inﬂationary
impulse, and the real exchange rate devaluates. In the subsequent quarters, the
price eﬀect increases further to a maximum of 0.15 percent after four quarters
before it slowly dies out. This reﬂects the well-known sluggishness of a wide
array of consumer prices. For example, the prices for alternative energy sources
like natural gas and for services like transport typically react with a delay. In
addition, it may take some time, until producers pass on their cost increases to
consumers. Finally, second–round eﬀects operating through wage negotiations
are implemented with some delay. Mirroring the price reaction, the short–term
interest rate hike continues for some quarters. Subsequently, it is quickly taken
back and reaches a trough after 12 quarters. This probably reﬂects the attempt
of the central bank to stabilize the economy as real output starts to decline after
two, and reaches a trough after ten, quarters.
2.2 Results of Extended Speciﬁcations
To get more insights into the transmission process after an oil price shock, we
extend the VAR model with additional variables. We do this by adding only one
variable at a time. This prevents an overﬁtting and guarantees that we do not
run out of degrees of freedom. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the extended speciﬁcation
7Figure 1: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock — Baseline Speciﬁcation
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Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to a 10 percent oil price shock. The solid lines denote
impulse responses, which are computed from the estimated VAR coeﬃcients. The shaded areas
are the 68 percent Hall percentile conﬁdence intervals, which are constructed from a bootstrap
procedure with 1000 replications (Hall, 1994). All variables are expressed in percent terms,
except for the nominal short–term interest rate which is expressed in basis points at an annual
rate. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
8(with the additional variable ordered last)
Xi,t = [oili,t, stii,t, gdpi,t, reeri,t, hicpi,t, zi,t], (3)
where zi,t denotes one of the following variables: the HICP component only in-
cluding energy items (hicpnrg), the HICP component only including unprocessed
food (hicpfoodu), the HICP component only including processed food (hicpfoodp),
the HICP component only including non–energy industrial goods (hicpigood), the
HICP component only including services (hicpserv),5 the domestic producer price
index of total industry (excluding construction) (dppi), the wages and salaries
component of the nominal labor cost index of sections C to K of the NACE Rev. 1
nomenclature (industry excluding construction and services excluding public ad-
ministration) deﬂated by the HICP (rlci), the wages and salaries component of
the nominal labor cost index of total industry (excluding construction, sections C
to E of the NACE Rev. 1 nomenclature) deﬂated by the HICP (rlciind), and the
wages and salaries component of the nominal labor cost index of services (exclud-
ing public administration, sections F to K of the NACE Rev. 1 nomenclature)
deﬂated by the HICP (rlciserv). All series are taken from the Eurostat data-
base and are linearly de-trended. The hicp and dppi series have been seasonally
adjusted using Census X12.
The reasons for choosing these variables as additional endogenous variables
in the VAR model are twofold. First, we would like to analyze the direct trans-
mission of oil price shocks to consumer prices by focussing on the price response
of energy goods, which are part of the consumption basket and which account
for on average 9 percent of households’ ﬁnal monetary consumption expenditure.
Second, with the remaining variables we would like to shed some light on the in-
direct transmission of oil price shocks to other components of the consumer price
index. On the one hand, higher costs for energy inputs in production are likely
to have an impact on producer prices, which indicate upstream pressures on the
prices for non–energy goods and services. On the other hand, the response of
wage costs to oil price increases is an indicator for understanding the importance
of second–round eﬀects on prices.
5These are the ﬁve principal components of the HICP that are published by Eurostat.
9The response of each of the additional variables to an oil price shock is shown
in Figure 2.6 Not surprisingly, the energy component of the HICP increases
instantaneously by about 1.5 percent and takes a development very similar to
that of the oil price. The price of processed food also rises on impact but reaches
the maximum reaction only after ﬁve quarters and remains elevated for more
than ten quarters. Interestingly, the reaction of unprocessed food prices is quite
diﬀerent. Being unaﬀected on impact, they slightly decrease for two quarters
before they rise considerably, reaching a maximum of 0.5 percent after 7 quarters.
In contrast, the prices for industrial goods and for services show almost no reaction
in the ﬁrst three quarters. Subsequently, they increase signiﬁcantly and peak after
8 to 9 quarters at around 0.07 and 0.09 percent, respectively. Hence, the reaction
pattern of the HICP components diﬀer markedly. In particular, the strong initial
response of the total HICP index is mainly driven by the prices for energy and
processed food.
Additional insights can be obtained from an analysis of producer prices and
labor costs. Producer prices go up instantaneously after an oil price shock. How-
ever, they transmit with a considerable lag into the prices for industrial goods
and services. This indicates that markups are temporally depressed before ﬁrms
are able to raise retail prices. Total real wage costs initially drop by 0.1 percent
before they start rising gradually. Given the response of the HICP, nominal wage
costs seem to react with some delay. However, the patterns are diﬀerent between
industry and services. The negative eﬀect on real wage costs in industry is pro-
nounced and long–lasting, while real wage costs in services drop only on impact.
They even rise above trend after about 10 quarters. Overall, real wages do not
seem to be extremely sticky. In particular, they show a signiﬁcant and, compared
to the HICP response, quantitatively important instantaneous reaction to an oil
price shock.
6As the responses of the ﬁve baseline variables are almost unaﬀected by the extension of the
VAR model, they are not shown again.
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Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to a 10 percent oil price shock. The solid lines denote
impulse responses, which are computed from the estimated VAR coeﬃcients. The shaded areas
are the 68 percent Hall percentile conﬁdence intervals, which are constructed from a bootstrap
procedure with 1000 replications (Hall, 1994). All variables are expressed in percent terms.
The horizontal axis is in quarters.
113 Heterogeneity across Countries
So far, we have estimated the panel VAR under the assumption that systematic
country diﬀerences can be explained by diﬀerent intercepts. However, there is
considerable evidence that the euro area countries are more heterogenous. The
two most obvious reasons for heterogenous country–speciﬁc reactions to an oil
price shock are, ﬁrst, the diﬀerent weights of oil in both production and household
consumption and, second, diﬀerent levels of wage rigidity. In order to take this
into account, we cluster the countries into two diﬀerent groups according to the
response of the overall price level to an expansionary oil price shock. Hence, the
countries are divided into a high pass–through group and a low pass–through group.
Since our approach is novel, we describe the methodology more explicitly.
3.1 Methodology
In principle, one can think of the reaction of overall price level to an oil price
shock as a general function of the country–speciﬁc characteristics. This implies
that the VAR parameters depend on these characteristics and, hence, the impulse
responses diﬀer from country to country. Therefore, countrywise estimation would
be optimal. Unfortunately, the precise estimation of impulse response coeﬃcients
within the VAR framework requires a relatively large number of observations.
Since for the reasons outlined above our sample does not start before 1996, we
need to construct country panels in order to increase the number of observations
by using the cross–section dimension. To facilitate an easy distinction between
such country panels, we consider only two of them, namely a high pass–through
group and a low pass–through group. Hence, the question we have to answer in
this section is how to allocate the countries in our sample to one of these two
groups. This is achieved in three steps.
1. Step: Deﬁne and Estimate the Distance between Sup–panels To
quantify the diﬀerence between any two sub–groups of countries, we need to
deﬁne a distance measure. As we are interested in the diﬀerent impulse responses
12of the overall price level after an oil price shock, we use
d =







￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, (4)
where b α1k and b α2k are the responses of the overall price level of the ﬁrst and second
sub–group, respectively, k periods after the occurrence of the shock, which are
computed from the estimated VAR coeﬃcients. We consider the response lags
q1 = 1 to q2 = 2 (short–run pass–through) and q1 = 3 to q2 = 12 (medium–run
pass–through). Hence, the distance measure in expression (4) reﬂects the absolute
value of the diﬀerence between the cumulated impulse responses.
At ﬁrst sight, it is now straightforward to allocate each country to either the
high pass–through group or the low pass–through group. One can simply estimate
all possible pairs of sub–groups and choose the pair with the largest distance. This
approach resembles a cluster algorithm, where the number of clusters is ﬁxed and
the distance between the cluster centers (i.e., the impulse response coeﬃcients)
is maximized. However, we have to bear in mind that the impulse response coef-
ﬁcients are not observed but estimated. Hence, choosing the maximum distance
pair only would contaminate the choice by a considerable portion of randomness.
In fact, we ﬁnd that there a many diﬀerent pairs of sub–groups that exhibit similar
distance measures.
Therefore, we proceed as follows. We estimate panel VAR models for all
possible pairs of sub–groups, which contain at least three countries to ensure
enough degrees of freedom for each sub–group.7 Overall the number of pairs of
sub–groups amounts to 957.8 For all pairs of sub–groups we generate impulse
responses to a standardized 10 percent oil price shock and calculate the distance
measure.
7As before the VAR models are estimated for the same set of variables as in the baseline
speciﬁcation (oil price, nominal short–term interest rate, real GDP, real eﬀective exchange rate
and overall price level) using a lag length of p = 4. The oil price shock is identiﬁed by imposing
a triangular orthogonalization.
8Notice that in our panel the total number of disjoint pairs of sub–groups amounts to 1024
(= 211/2). Given that we consider only pairs of sub–groups containing at least three countries,
this reduces the number of pairs to 957, since there are one combination without any country,
11 combinations with only one country and 55 combinations – (10×11)/2 – with two countries.
132. Step: Select Pairs of Sub–groups with Signiﬁcant Distance Measure
Then, we identify all pairs of sub–groups that exhibit a signiﬁcant distance mea-
sure, where signiﬁcance is detected as follows. Assume that the estimated impulse
response coeﬃcients b α1k and b α2k asymptotically follow a normal distribution.
Then the sums of the coeﬃcients considered for the distance measure, denoted
by b s1 =
Pq2
k=q1 b α1k and b s2 =
Pq2
k=q1 b α2k, are also asymptotically normal. Under
the null hypothesis that all pairs of sub–groups are identical and have the same
sum of population coeﬃcients s =
Pq2
k=q1 αk, the only systematic diﬀerence in the
estimation results is the size of the panel from which they are estimated.
The sums of the estimated coeﬃcients should be approximately distributed
as:












where N1 is the size of the ﬁrst sub–group, N2 is the size of the second sub–group,
T is the number of observations corrected for the number of lags p in the VAR
model and σ2 is the population variance that is assumed to be constant across
countries. Furthermore, assuming that the countries are independent, we can
apply a classical two–sided diﬀerence test using the statistic: d = b s1 − b s2. Under




2/(N2T) = (1/N1 + 1/N2)σ
2/T. (7)
Since σ2 is unknown, we estimate the population variance from expression (7) by
noting that:
σ
2 = TVar(d)/(1/N1 + 1/N2), (8)
where the sample variance of the distance measure Var(d) is calculated from the
numerous realizations of d. Given the estimate of σ2, we construct a t–statistic and
compare it with the corresponding 95 percent critical value of the t–distribution.
As a result, we have identiﬁed all those pairs of sub–groups that are signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from each other. If there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence at all, we
would conclude that all countries show the same response of the overall price level
14to an oil price shock and terminate the analysis here. However, we ﬁnd 353 (266)
signiﬁcant distance measures for the response lags q1 = 1 to q2 = 2 (q1 = 3 to
q2 = 12). In contrast to using only the maximum–distance pair, we thus consider
all the diﬀerent ways to split the panel of countries into signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
sub–groups. Thereby, we alleviate the problem that the results could be driven
by the considerable sampling error that aﬀects the ordering of random variables.
However, this approach in turn raises the question how to allocate a single country
to either the high pass–through group or the low pass–through group.
3. Step: Allocate each Country to either the High or the Low Pass–
through Group The allocation problem is tackled in the ﬁnal step. Using the
pairs of sub–groups with a signiﬁcant distance measure we calculate the frequency
that a speciﬁc country belongs to the sub–groups with the stronger reaction of
the overall price level to an oil price shock. If this frequency is above a threshold
that is determined below, then the respective country is allocated to the high
pass–through group, otherwise it is allocated to the low pass–through group.
The idea behind this rule is as follows. Assume there are three “true” high
pass–through countries. Then we should expect that the distance measure is
maximized when these three countries are put into one sub–group and all the
others in the other sub–group. However, due to sampling error, a diﬀerent pair
of sub–groups may actually exhibit the largest distance. Using our approach, we
may at least expect to ﬁnd each of the three high pass–through countries to be
more often in the high pass–through sub–group than any of the other countries.
To accomplish this, we now derive the threshold for the frequency that a
speciﬁc country belongs to the high pass–through sub–groups. From the previous
step we know which pairs of sub–groups are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other.
Now we count how many times each country is in a high pass–through sub–group.
A priorily, each country has the same chance to be a high pass–through country.
Hence, under this null hypothesis there is, for each pair of sub–groups, a 50 percent
chance that a speciﬁc country is in the high pass–through sub–group. Now assume
that there are a total of Nc diﬀerent pairs of sub–groups of which n exhibit a
signiﬁcant distance measure. Then, for each country, the number of times it is in
the high pass–through sub–group resembles a random experiment, where n draws
15without replacement are taken from a population of size Nc that is composed
of 50 percent white (=high pass–through) and 50 percent black (=low pass–
through) elements. Accordingly, the frequency x – that a particular country is
found to be in the high pass–through group – follows a hypergeometric distribution:
f(x;Nc,Nc/2,n), where the number of pairs Nc depends on the total number of
countries M and the minimum size of a sub–group.9
Finally, from the hypergeometric distribution we derive a 95 percent critical
value for the frequency that a particular country belongs to the high pass–through
group. If any country is selected more often, it is unlikely that this is due to pure
chance. Hence, we allocate these countries to the high pass–through group. All
other countries are allocated to the low pass–through group.
3.2 Identiﬁed Country Groups
Table 1 summarizes the country clusters for the two time horizons. While some
countries either belong to the group with a high pass–through (Austria, Finland,
France and Germany) or a low pass–through (Greece and Portugal) in both the
short run and the medium run, the other countries show either a high pass–
through in the short run and a low pass–through in the medium run (Belgium,
Ireland and Spain) or vice versa (Italy and the Netherlands). Figure 3 plots the
relative frequencies of belonging to the high pass–through group for the two hori-
zons together with the average critical value of the hypergeometrical distributions.
Table 1: Country Clusters
Horizon High pass–through group Low pass–through group
1-2 quarters AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IE, ES GR, IT, NL, PT
3-12 quarters AT, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL BE, GR, IE, PT, ES
9Let us denote the the minimum size of a sub–group by m. Then the number of possible pairs







. In our case, with M = 11 countries
and a minimum sub–group size of m = 3, we have Nc = 2048 pairs. Of these pairs, we have
to estimate only 2048/2 = 1024 because, e.g., the ordering of the pair A = {1,2,3,4,5,6},B =
{7,8,9,10,11} or A = {7,8,9,10,11},B = {1,2,3,4,5,6} is irrelevant, while ex ante either A
or B could be the strong reaction sub–group.
16Figure 3: Relative frequency of belonging to the high pass–through group for
diﬀerent horizons following the shock



























Notes: For each country the bars show the relative frequency in percent of belonging to
the high pass–through group in the short–run and in the medium–run. The total number
of combinations of countries n that show a signiﬁcantly higher distance is 352 and 259,
respectively. The horizontal line denotes the average critical value for x (over the two horizons)
that a country is in the high pass–through group.
173.3 Impulse Responses when Countries are Clustered ac-
cording to Short–run Pass–through
Next we re-estimate panel VAR models for the pair of country groups that is
clustered according to the short–run pass–through of the oil price shock to the
overall price level. The impulse responses are shown in Figure 4. To facilitate a
comparison with the initial assumption that all countries are equal, the conﬁdence
regions for the impulse responses estimated from the baseline VAR model are
reported as shaded areas.
First note that the oil price development is almost indistinguishable between
the groups. This conﬁrms that the groups are hit by an identical shock and dif-
ferences in the responses of other variables are due to the structural heterogeneity
between them. The most notable diﬀerences arise at the HICP responses. In the
low pass–through group the HICP instantaneously rises by 0.05 percent, whereas
in the high pass–through group the increase amounts to 0.15 percent. The im-
pact reaction of both groups is outside the conﬁdence region estimated from the
baseline VAR model which conﬁrms that there is heterogeneity. The response dif-
ference between the groups amounts to 0.10 percentage points and lasts for four
quarters. In the following quarters, the reaction of the high pass–through group
dies out more quickly than that of the low pass–through group. In contrast to
the HICP reaction, the real exchange rate response is more pronounced in the low
pass–through group. The responses of the short–term interest rate and of GDP
are very similar and statistically indistinguishable. All this indicates that in the
economies of the high pass–through group prices rather than real exchange rates
carry the burden of adjustment while in the economies of the low pass–through
group it is vice versa.
To analyze the reasons behind the diﬀerences, we report the impulse responses
of the 9 variables estimated with the extended speciﬁcation in Figure 5. To
facilitate a comparison between the country groups, we also report the diﬀerences
between the impulse responses in Figure 6. The initial diﬀerence in the response
of the HICP is largely driven by the energy component of the HICP. While energy
prices rise by 1.6 percent on impact in the high pass–through group, they only
rise by 1.1 percent in the low pass–through group. This can largely be explained
18Figure 4: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock — Countries Clustered Ac-
cording to Short–run Pass–through
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Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to an oil price shock. The lines denote impulse
responses, which are computed from the estimated VAR coeﬃcients. The dotted lines refer to
the estimation of the complete panel including 11 countries of the euro area, the solid lines to
the high pass–through group (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IE, ES), and the dashed lines to the low
pass–through group (GR, IT, NL, PT). The shaded areas are the 68 percent Hall percentile
conﬁdence intervals resulting from the estimation of the complete panel. They are constructed
from a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications (Hall, 1994). All variables are expressed
in percent terms, except for the nominal short–term interest rate which is expressed in basis
points at an annual rate. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
19Figure 5: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock — Countries Clustered Ac-
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Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to an oil price shock. The lines denote impulse
responses, which are computed from the estimated VAR coeﬃcients. The dotted lines refer to
the estimation of the complete panel including 11 countries of the euro area, the solid lines to
the high pass–through group (AT, BE, FI, FR, DE, IE, ES), and the dashed lines to the low
pass–through group (GR, IT, NL, PT). The shaded areas are the 68 percent Hall percentile
conﬁdence intervals resulting from the estimation of the complete panel. They are constructed
from a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications (Hall, 1994). All variables are expressed in
percent terms. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
20Figure 6: Impulse Response Diﬀerential between High Pass–through and Low
Pass–through Group — Countries Clustered According to Short–run Pass–
through
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Notes: The diﬀerence between the impulse responses is expressed in percentage points. The
horizontal axis is in quarters.
21by the diﬀerent weights of energy in the HICP basket. The scatter plot in Figure
7 shows that the frequency of being allocated to the high pass–through country
group increases with the households’ ﬁnal monetary consumption expenditure
for energy items. Diﬀerent fuel taxes may also play a role. Since the excise is
imposed as a ﬁxed euro amount of tax per litre of gasoline, an identical percent
increase in the price of gasoline net of taxes leads to a higher percent increase in
the ﬁnal price of gasoline in those countries where the excise tax is lower. Figure
7 conﬁrms that there is negative relationship between the frequency of belonging
to the short–run high pass–through group and the level of the gasoline tax.
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Among the other HICP components, the price reactions of processed and
unprocessed food also contribute to a stronger overall price increase of the high
pass–through group. In contrast, the prices for industrial goods and services do
not react immediately. The responses of the upstream producer prices and labor
costs should not play any role for HICP dispersion in the ﬁrst two quarters, as
their impact is typically assumed to materialize only in the medium run.
223.4 Impulse Responses when Countries are Clustered ac-
cording to Medium–run Pass–through
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses to an oil price shock for the two groups that
are identiﬁed as the medium–run high pass–through countries (AT, FI, FR, DE,
IT, NL) and low pass–through countries (BE, GR, IE, PT, ES). While the oil price
development after the shock is again almost indistinguishable between groups, the
HICP response is markedly diﬀerent in size but not so much in the overall shape.
The maximum eﬀect in the high pass–through group is 0.18 percent as opposed to
0.13 percent in the low pass-through group. Moreover, the responses lie outside
the conﬁdence region estimated from the baseline VAR, which conﬁrms that there
is signiﬁcant heterogeneity. The diﬀerence in price responses is accompanied by
diﬀerences in short–term GDP responses and medium–term real exchange rate
responses while the development of the interest rate is very similar across groups.
In particular, the stronger slump in GDP in the low pass-through group indicates
that the adjustment in this group works relatively more through the real side of
the economy.
Again, a more detailed analysis is possible with the extended speciﬁcation.
Figures 9 and 10 show that the heterogenous medium–run response of the HICP
is mainly due to the evolution of prices for services and—to a lesser extent—
for non–energy industrial goods. While the reaction of service prices reaches its
peak after nine to ten quarters in both groups, the maximum eﬀect in the high
pass–through group is 0.12 percent compared to only 0.04 percent in the low
pass–through group. The prices for non–energy industrial goods reach their peak
one or two quarters earlier. The diﬀerential between the two groups is on average
0.04 percentage points in the second and third year following the shock.
Looking at the determinants of the consumer prices, it turns out that the
producer prices react slightly stronger in the low pass–through group on impact.
However, from the fourth quarter on the increase in domestic producer prices
turns out to be more pronounced in the high pass–through group. While in both
groups producer prices peak after four quarters, producer prices fall much faster
in the low pass–through group, resulting in a maximum diﬀerential of more than
0.15 percentage points after eight quarters. The dependence on oil in relation
23Figure 8: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock — Countries Clustered Ac-
cording to Medium–run Pass–through
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Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to an oil price shock. The lines denote impulse
responses, which are computed from the estimated VAR coeﬃcients. The dotted lines refer to
the estimation of the complete panel including 11 countries of the euro area, the solid lines
to the high pass–through group (AT, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL), and the dashed lines to the low
pass–through group (BE, GR, IE, PT, ES). The shaded areas are the 68 percent Hall percentile
conﬁdence intervals resulting from the estimation of the complete panel. They are constructed
from a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications (Hall, 1994). All variables are expressed
in percent terms, except for the nominal short–term interest rate which is expressed in basis
points at an annual rate. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
24Figure 9: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock — Countries Clustered Ac-
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Notes: Orthogonalized impulse responses to an oil price shock. The lines denote impulse
responses, which are computed from the estimated VAR coeﬃcients. The dotted lines refer to
the estimation of the complete panel including 11 countries of the euro area, the solid lines
to the high pass–through group (AT, FI, FR, DE, IT, NL), and the dashed lines to the low
pass–through group (BE, GR, IE, PT, ES). The shaded areas are the 68 percent Hall percentile
conﬁdence intervals resulting from the estimation of the complete panel. They are constructed
from a bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications (Hall, 1994). All variables are expressed in
percent terms. The horizontal axis is in quarters.
25Figure 10: Impulse Response Diﬀerential between High Pass–through and Low
Pass–through Group — Countries Clustered According to Medium–run Pass–
through
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Notes: The diﬀerence between the impulse responses is expressed in percentage points. The
horizontal axis is in quarters.
26to gross value added in industrial production seems not to be the driving force
behind the diﬀerential in the response of domestic producer prices across country
groups and over time. While industry oil consumption varies between 3 and 12
percent of gross value added, its relationship with the frequency of belonging to
the medium–run high pass–through group is only weakly positive (see the upper
left scatter plot in Figure 11).
The medium–run heterogeneity is mainly caused by large diﬀerentials in the
evolution of real labor costs in the industry sector. While in the high pass–
through group real labor costs remain more or less unchanged in the ﬁrst year
following the shock, implying that nominal wages and the price level increased
proportionally, real industry labor costs in the low pass–through group dropped
immediately by −0.2 percent and remained at this low level for around one year,
before gradually returning to baseline. Thus, the countries with a higher degree
of real industry wage rigidity exhibit a larger medium–run reaction of producer
prices and non–energy industrial goods prices. Cross–country diﬀerences in the
process of wage formation are typically attributed to diﬀerences in the wage bar-
gaining institutions. In the euro area wage formation is to a large extent based on
collective bargaining structures. However, the degrees of union coverage, union
density and bargaining coordination and the extent to which the government is
involved (indirectly) in the bargaining process diﬀer widely across countries. The
scatter plots in Figure 11 indicate that there is a positive relationship between
the frequency of belonging to the medium–run high pass–through group and the
labor market institutions.
The response of wages and salaries in the service sector, i.e. the sector which
is commonly characterized as being excluded from international competition, is
diﬀerent from the response in the industry sector. While in both country groups
real labor costs drop by approximately 0.1 percent on impact, they subsequently
rise above baseline in the low pass–through group, whereas they continue to be
negative for around two years in the high pass–through group. An explanation for
this discrepancy between the responses of salaries and wages in the two sectors is
that some of the bargaining institutions not only vary markedly across countries,
but also across sectors. Du Caju et al. (2008), for example, report that in
Europe trade union density is much lower in market services than in the industrial
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28sector. However, the dispersion of real wage costs in the service sector between
the two country groups does not seem to translate onto the prices of services in the
consumption basket, where the pass–through of the oil price shock is signiﬁcantly
higher in the high pass–through group. This implies that the ﬁnal price of services
is not only determined by wage costs in the service sector, but also by the costs
of other intermediate inputs (energy, industrial goods), which are aﬀected more
by the increase in oil prices in the high pass–through group.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the causes of price dispersion in the euro area emerging in
response to a shock that hits all member countries symmetrically. We use a panel
VAR model which is estimated over the period 1996–2007 to generate impulse
responses of a range of price and wage variables to an oil price shock. To detect
heterogeneities in the transmission of a structural shock in the context of a panel
VAR model we suggest a data–driven approach that clusters countries into disjoint
groups according to the impact of the oil price shock on the overall price level.
We split our sample of countries into two groups – a high pass–through group and
a low pass–through group – that are endogenously identiﬁed by using a distance
measure, which is determined by the absolute value of the diﬀerence between
cumulated impulse responses of the overall price level. We consider the responses
of consumer prices over diﬀerent simulation horizons, focusing on the oil price
pass–through into national prices in the short– and the medium–run after the
occurrence of the shock.
Our ﬁndings indicate that the response of consumer prices is very heteroge-
nous across member countries. Diﬀerences in the short–run pass–through can be
attributed to the weight of energy in the consumption basket. This type of price
dispersion should, however, not be a cause for concern for the ECB per se. As
long as the the economies are ﬂexible enough, the adjustment of relative prices
will only take a few quarters before restoring a new equilibrium.
The policy–relevant ﬁnding of this paper is that heterogeneity in the medium–
run response of consumer prices is mainly due to diﬀerent responses of wages and
salaries in the industry sector, which is an indication of diﬀerent degrees of price
29and wage rigidities in the member countries and which could give rise to long–
lasting distortions in relative prices after exogenous shocks. The existence of
diﬀerent degrees of national structural ineﬃciencies has important consequences
for the single monetary policy in a currency union. Even if the ECB succeeds
to restore price stability in the medium term, this does not guarantee that all
economies operate at the eﬃcient frontier (Dellas and Tavlas, 2005). For an
inﬂation targeting central bank in a currency union Benigno (2004) showed that
if the degrees of rigidities are diﬀerent across countries, monetary policy should
attach a higher weight to the country with a higher degree of rigidity.
30References
Altissimo, F., M. Ehrmann, and F. Smets (2006): “Inﬂation Persistence and
Price–setting Behaviour in the Euro Area – A Summary of the IPN Evidence,”
Occasional Paper Series 46, European Central Bank.
Andersson, M., A. Gieseck, B. Pierluigi, and N. Vidalis (2008): “Wage
Growth Dispersion across the Euro Area Countries – Some Stylised Facts,”
Occasional Paper Series 90, European Central Bank.
Angeloni, I., and M. Ehrmann (2007): “Euro Area Inﬂation Diﬀerentials,”
Topics in Macroeconomics, 7(1), 1509–1509.
Arpaia, A., and K. Pichelmann (2007): “Nominal and Real Wage Flexibility
in EMU,” International Economics and Economic Policy, 4(3), 299–328.
Baltagi, B. H. (2005): Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. John Wiley &
Sons, Chichester, 3rd edn.
Benigno, P. (2004): “Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Area,” Journal
of International Economics, 63(2), 293–320.
Blanchard, O., and J. Gal´ ı (2007): “The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Oil
Shocks: Why are the 2000s so diﬀerent from the 1970s?,” NBER Working
Paper 13368, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dellas, H., and G. Tavlas (2005): “Wage Rigidity and Monetary Union,”
Economic Journal, 115(506), 907–927.
Du Caju, P., E. Gautier, D. Momferatou, and M. Ward-Warmedinger
(2008): “Institutional Features of Wage Bargaining in 23 European Countries,
the US and Japan,” Working Paper Series 974, European Central Bank.
European Central Bank (2003): “Inﬂation Diﬀerentials in the Euro Area:
Potential Causes and Policy Implicatios,” Occasional Paper September, Euro-
pean Central Bank.
31(2005): “Monetary Policy and Inﬂation Diﬀerentials in a Heterogenous
Currency Area,” Monthly Bulletin, May, 61–77.
Hahn, E. (2003): “Pass–through of External Shocks to Euro Area Inﬂation,”
Working Paper Series 243, European Central Bank.
Hall, S. G. (1994): Applied Economic Forecasting Techniques. Harvester
Wheatsheaf, New York.
Hofmann, B., and H. Remsperger (2005): “Inﬂation Diﬀerentials among
Euro Area Countries: Potential Causes and Consequences,” Journal of Asian
Economics, 16(3), 403–419.
Kilian, L. (2009): “Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: Disentangling Demand
and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market,” American Economic Review,
(forthcoming).
Mongelli, F. (2005): “‘New’ Views on the Optimum Currency Area Theory:
What is EMU Telling Us?,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 43, 607–635.
Nickell, W. (2006): “The CEP–OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004),” Dis-
cussion paper, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics
and Political Science.
Peersman, G., and I. Van Robays (2008): “Oil and the Euro Area Economy,”
Paper prepared for the 49th panel meeting of Economic Policy in Prague.
32CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2657 Susanne Neckermann, Reto Cueni and Bruno S. Frey, What is an Award Worth? An 
Econometric Assessment of the Impact of Awards on Employee Performance, May 
2009 
 
2658 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Economic Geography 
within and between European Nations: The Role of Market Potential and Density across 
Space and Time, May 2009 
 
2659 Giovanni Facchini and Cecilia Testa, Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than 
two?, May 2009 
 
2660 Carsten Kowalczyk and Raymond Riezman, Trade Agreements, May 2009 
 
2661 Oliver Falck, Stephan Heblich and Elke Luedemann, Identity and Entrepreneurship, 
May 2009 
 
2662 Christian Lessmann and Gunther Markwardt, One Size Fits All? Decentralization, 
Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats, May 2009 
 
2663 Felix Bierbrauer, On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods, 
May 2009 
 
2664 Alessandro Cigno, Agency in Family Policy: A Survey, May 2009 
 
2665 Claudia M. Buch and Christian Pierdzioch, Low Skill but High Volatility?, May 2009 
 
2666 Hendrik Jürges, Kerstin Schneider, Martin Senkbeil and Claus H. Carstensen, 
Assessment Drives Learning: The Effect of Central Exit Exams on Curricular 
Knowledge and Mathematical Literacy, June 2009 
 
2667 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann, Schooling, Cognitive Skills, and the Latin 
American Growth Puzzle, June 2009 
 
2668 Ourania Karakosta, Christos Kotsogiannis and Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, Does 
Indirect Tax Harmonization Deliver Pareto Improvements in the Presence of Global 
Public Goods?, June 2009 
 
2669 Aleksandra Riedl and Silvia Rocha-Akis, Testing the Tax Competition Theory: How 
Elastic are National Tax Bases in OECD Countries?, June 2009 
 
2670 Dominique Demougin and Carsten Helm, Incentive Contracts and Efficient 
Unemployment Benefits, June 2009 
 
2671 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Long Memory in US Real Output 
per Capita, June 2009  
2672 Jim Malley and Ulrich Woitek, Productivity Shocks and Aggregate Cycles in an 
Estimated Endogenous Growth Model, June 2009 
 
2673 Vivek Ghosal, Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization under Changing Market 
Conditions, June 2009 
 
2674 Francesco Menoncin and Paolo M. Panteghini, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation in 
the Real World, June 2009 
 
2675 Thomas Hemmelgarn and Gaёtan Nicodème, Tax Co-ordination in Europe: Assessing 
the First Years of the EU-Savings Taxation Directive, June 2009 
 
2676 Oliver Himmler, The Effects of School Competition on Academic Achievement and 
Grading Standards, June 2009 
 
2677 Rolf Golombek and Michael Hoel, International Cooperation on Climate-Friendly 
Technologies, June 2009 
 
2678 Martin Cave and Matthew Corkery, Regulation and Barriers to Trade in 
Telecommunications Services in the European Union, June 2009 
 
2679 Costas Arkolakis, A Unified Theory of Firm Selection and Growth, June 2009 
 
2680 Michelle R. Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos, International 
Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly 
Determined, June 2009 
 
2681 Marcelo Resende, Capital Structure and Regulation in U.S. Local Telephony: An 
Exploratory Econometric Study; June 2009 
 
2682 Marc Gronwald and Janina Ketterer, Evaluating Emission Trading as a Policy Tool – 
Evidence from Conditional Jump Models, June 2009 
 
2683 Stephan O. Hornig, Horst Rottmann and Rüdiger Wapler, Information Asymmetry, 
Education Signals and the Case of Ethnic and Native Germans, June 2009 
 
2684 Benoit Dostie and Rajshri Jayaraman, The Effect of Adversity on Process Innovations 
and Managerial Incentives, June 2009 
 
2685 Peter Egger, Christian Keuschnigg and Hannes Winner, Incorporation and Taxation: 
Theory and Firm-level Evidence, June 2009 
 
2686 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Emmanuel Petrakis, Timing of Technology Adoption and 
Product Market Competition, June 2009 
 
2687 Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong and Jérémie Lefebvre, An Empirical Analysis of Legal 
Insider Trading in the Netherlands, June 2009 
 
2688 Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock and Roman M. Sheremeta, An Experimental 
Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games, June 2009  
2689 Alexander Chudik, M. Hashem Pesaran and Elisa Tosetti, Weak and Strong Cross 
Section Dependence and Estimation of Large Panels, June 2009 
 
2690 Mohamed El Hedi Arouri and Christophe Rault, On the Influence of Oil Prices on Stock 
Markets: Evidence from Panel Analysis in GCC Countries, June 2009 
 
2691 Lars P. Feld and Christoph A. Schaltegger, Political Stability and Fiscal Policy – Time 
Series Evidence for the Swiss Federal Level since 1849, June 2009 
 
2692 Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald, A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual 
Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth, June 2009 
 
2693 Patricia Funk and Christina Gathmann, Does Direct Democracy Reduce the Size of 
Government? New Evidence from Historical Data, 1890-2000, June 2009 
 
2694 Kirsten Wandschneider and Nikolaus Wolf, Shooting on a Moving Target: Explaining 
European Bank Rates during the Interwar Period, June 2009 
 
2695 J. Atsu Amegashie, Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan’s 
Dilemma, June 2009 
 
2696 Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg, War and Relatedness, June 2009 
 
2697 Steven Brakman, Charles van Marrewijk and Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Market 
Liberalization in the European Natural Gas Market – the Importance of Capacity 
Constraints and Efficiency Differences, July 2009 
 
2698 Huifang Tian, John Whalley and Yuezhou Cai, Trade Sanctions, Financial Transfers 
and BRIC’s Participation in Global Climate Change Negotiations, July 2009 
 
2699 Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer, Government Decentralization as a Disincentive 
for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis, July 2009 
 
2700 Balázs Égert, Tomasz Koźluk and Douglas Sutherland, Infrastructure and Growth: 
Empirical Evidence, July 2009 
 
2701 Felix Bierbrauer, Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large 
Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty, July 2009 
 
2702 Marc Gronwald, Investigating the U.S. Oil-Macroeconomy Nexus using Rolling 
Impulse Responses, July 2009 
 
2703 Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, Government Deficits in the European Union: An Analysis 
of Entry and Exit Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2704 Stergios Skaperdas, The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence, July 
2009 
 
2705 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Spend-and-tax: A Panel Data Investigation for 
the EU, July 2009  
2706 Bruno S. Frey, Punishment – and beyond, July 2009 
 
2707 Michael Melvin and Mark P. Taylor, The Crisis in the Foreign Exchange Market, July 
2009 
 
2708 Firouz Gahvari, Friedman Rule in a Model with Endogenous Growth and Cash-in-
advance Constraint, July 2009 
 
2709 Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public 
Investment?, July 2009 
 
2710 Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen, The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
Business Cycles in Asian Emerging Economies, July 2009 
 
2711 J. Atsu Amegashie, Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment, July 2009 
 
2712 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Response to Baker and Fugh-Berman’s Critique of my Paper, 
“Why has Longevity Increased more in some States than in others?”, July 2009 
 
2713 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Business Models for Media Firms: 
Does Competition Matter for how they Raise Revenue?, July 2009 
 
2714 Beatrix Brügger, Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller, Does Culture Affect 
Unemployment? Evidence from the Röstigraben, July 2009 
 
2715 Oliver Falck, Michael Fritsch and Stephan Heblich, Bohemians, Human Capital, and 
Regional Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2716 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their 
Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2717 Ben J. Heijdra and Jochen O. Mierau, Annuity Market Imperfection, Retirement and 
Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2718 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Price Dispersion in the 
Euro Area: The Case of a Symmetric Oil Price Shock, July 2009 